Causes and background of VB_GRAM .
Impact assessment of VB_GRAM .
Key tracker metrics for VB_GRAM .
The transition from MGNREGA to the VIKSIT Bharat-Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 (VB-G RAM G) represents a paradigm shift in India's rural social security architecture. Moving away from the bottom-up, demand-driven model of MGNREGA, the new Act adopts a top-down 'Normative Allocation' approach tied to the 16th Finance Commission's horizontal devolution formula. This structural change fundamentally alters fiscal federalism by capping central expenditure and shifting the burden of any excess demand onto state governments. While the expansion of guaranteed work to 125 days and the introduction of a mandatory 60-day seasonal pause aim to harmonize rural employment with agricultural cycles, the move creates a 'winner-loser' dynamic among states based on their financial devolution weights. Additionally, the framework introduces performance-linked central controls, incentivizing states through bonuses for timely payments and rigorous social audits. The success of this transition hinges on robust e-KYC verification and the ability of states to establish dedicated, non-lapsable employment guarantee funds to manage potential fiscal stress.
The transition from MGNREGA to the Viksit Bharat-Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (VB-G RAM G) represents a fundamental paradigm shift in India's rural social security architecture. It moves from a demand-driven, open-ended welfare model to a normative, supply-constrained framework aligned with the 16th Finance Commission's horizontal devolution logic. By prioritizing 'GSDP distance' (42.5% weightage), the scheme seeks to institutionalize fiscal equity, channeling resources toward lagging states. Furthermore, the introduction of a 60:40 cost-sharing mechanism and performance-linked incentives aims to enhance state-level accountability and asset quality, addressing chronic issues of corruption and delayed project completion. However, this structural shift introduces significant socio-economic risks. The move from a legal guarantee of work to a fixed normative allocation potentially dilutes the 'Right to Work,' making the safety net vulnerable during sudden economic shocks or droughts. Additionally, while the scheme promotes fiscal prudence for the Centre, the requirement for states to co-fund wages may exacerbate the fiscal distress of the very states—such as Bihar or Uttar Pradesh—that the scheme intends to support, potentially creating a paradox of implementation.